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Introduction 
 (1) What are the alternatives in a situation of deliberation and planning? 
 (2) What should a coherent formulation of act-utilitarianism look like? 
 
These two questions have been at the focus of interest in a debate initiated by Lars 
Bergström's thesis The Alternatives and Consequences of Action. In this paper I 
wish to examine some of the proposed answers to (1) and (2), and some of the 
arguments given in favour of these answers. I will concentrate on the part of the 
debate represented in the literature listed at the end of the essay. 
 It is hard to present the alleged problems and the proposed solutions in a way 
that does justice to the participants of the debate without actually letting them 
speak for themselves, through their own papers. I will nevertheless try to give the 
reader some feeling of what is at stake without indulging in all the technical 
subtleties of the discussion. More than simply expose the ideas of others, I intend 
to discuss what's sound and unsound in the ideas put forward, and I am also 
presenting my own position at the end of the paper. 
 In part one I present the theories of the debaters and apply them to two 
imaginary cases in order to highlight their differences. In part two I propose and 
discuss two criteria of adequacy for utilitarian principles. In part three, the criteria 
are applied to one of the imaginary cases from part one, and used in a critical 
discussion of the theories presented there. In part four finally, I outline my own 
theory. 
 Even though the debate displays some fundamental disagreements, it is best 
understood against a background of agreement. Thus every participant accepts – at 
least for the sake of argument – what could be called ‘the spirit of act-
utilitarianism’. The classic formulation of one of the most fundamental principles of 
utilitarianism is the following: 
 
 (U) An action, a, ought to be performed if and only if its consequences are 
better than those of every alternative to a. 
 
                                                
* This text was written almost twenty years ago and discussed in Erik Carlson’s 
Consequentialism Reconsidered (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1995). Since some people have asked 
for copies, I decided to transfer it to electronic form. I’ve tried to purge the text of numerous 
inevitable scanning errors, but readers beware!  
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According to most utilitarians the concept of ‘ought’ is relative to a scale of value on 
which the (total) consequences of actions are compared. It is also taken to be 
relative to a set of alternatives, including a and every alternative to a. Such a set is 
for obvious reasons called an alternative-set. 
 The following restrictions on alternative-sets to which (U) applies were 
proposed and argued for by Bergström in [1] (p 29 ff): 
 
 (AS) The set A is an alternative-set if, and only if, (i) every member of A is a 
particular action1, (ii) A has at least two different members, the members 
of A are (iii) agent-identical2, (iv) time-identical3, (v) performable, (vi) 
incompatible in pairs4, and (vii) jointly exhaustive5. If a and b are 
alternatives, they are members of the same alternative-set. 
 
‘Every alternative’ in (U) should then be understood as ‘all members of the same 
alternative-set as the action in question’. The restrictions seem to be reasonable. 
But this specification of ‘every alternative’ seems to give the utilitarian severe 
problems in most or all cases. The underlying reason is that it seems that for a 
given person and a given situation, there are several alternative-sets, that is: several 
sets of alternatives fulfilling the conditions in (AS). I will now look at such a 
situation. 
 
Case One 
 
A person, P, at a time, t, can perform each of and only the following actions: 
a (have a cigarette), b (not have a cigarette), a' (have a cigarette and read a 
paper on smoking and lung-cancer) and a" (have a cigarette, but read no 
paper on smoking and lung-cancer). The consequences of these actions are 
valued as follows: a' has better consequences than b while a and a'' has 
worse consequences than both a' and b. 
 
Assuming that these actions are all time-identical, {a, b} as well as {a', a", b} seem 
to be alternative-sets according to (AS). If (U) is applied to {a, b}, the result seems 
to be that b ought to be done, while a ought not to be done. If, on the other hand, 
(U) is applied to {a' , a", b} the result is that a' ought to be done, while a'' and b 
ought not to be done. We are now facing two apparent problems: 
 
 (P1) In Case One, a' ought to be done, and if a' is done this implies that a is 
done, but a ought not to be done in Case One. 
                                                
1 A particular action is relative both to persons and times. My typing now is for example a 
particular action. Particular actions could be contrasted with generic actions, which are not 
relative to both persons and times. “My typing”, “typing now” and “typing” are all generic 
actions. 
2 Two actions are agent-identical if they have the same agent. 
3 Two acrions are time-identical if they have the same time-interval. 
4 This restriction is invoked to make sure that if one of the alternatives is performed, none 
of the other alternatives is performed. 
5 If the members of A is jointly exhaustive, at least one of the members of A must be 
performed. Together with (vi), (vii) ensures that one and only one of the members of  an 
alternative-set will ever be performed. 
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 (P2) In Case One, it is true that b ought to be done, but it is also true that b 
ought not to be done. 
 
(P2) is an outright paradox. (P1) would be paradoxical if the following principle is 
true: 
 
 (c) If an action a' ought to be done, and if that a' is done logically implies that 
a is done, then a ought to be done. 
 
Maybe (c) is intuitively plausible. With (c), (P1) implies that a ought to be done and 
that a ought not to be done. This is surely a paradox as it stands. The situation can 
also be seen as a moral dilemma – if P does a', which ought to be done, P will also 
do a, which ought not to be done. We do not need (c) to reach this conclusion.  
 I will now put forward the theories of Bergström, Feldman, Sobel and Tännsjö 
and sketch how these theories seek to take care of the problems. 
 For Bergström the solution is to apply (U) only to relevant alternative-sets. 
What then is a relevant set of alternatives? Bergström has proposed several 
answers to this question (see [1], pp 42-55), but in [3] (pp 124-125) he seems to 
have decided on the following characterization: 
 
 (R) A is a relevant alternative-set for P in S if, and only if, A is an alternative-
set for P in S and, for every A', if A' is another alternative-set for P in S, 
and A' is an expansion of A, then either (i) A and A' are not (U)-
inconsistent, or (ii) there exists some alternative-set for P in S which is an 
expansion of A' and which is not (U)-inconsistent with A. 
 
An alternative-set A is an alternative-set for P in S if the actions in A are 
performable by P in S. Two or more alternative-sets are (U)-inconsistent if the 
normative conclusions which follow when (U) is applied to these alternative-sets 
are inconsistent. An action a' is a version (quasi-version) of an action a if a' is 
different from but agent-identical and time-identical (not time-identical) with a, 
and it is logically necessary that if a' is performed, then a is also performed. If A 
and A' are different alternative-sets, then A' is an expansion of A if for every action 
a, a is a member of A only if a or some version or quasi-version of a is a member of 
A'. 
 In Case One it seems that {a, b} and {a', a", b} cannot both be relevant 
alternative-sets. If we assume (unrealistically) that these are the only alternative-
sets for P at t, then, since {a, b} is (U)-inconsistent with it's expansion {a', a", b}, 
and since there is no expansion of {a', a", b}, the latter must be the relevant 
alternative-set for P at t. Thus, a will be given no normative status by (U), and b 
will only be given normative status relative to one alternative-set: it ought not to 
be done. This resolves (P1) and (P2) and makes clear that (c) does not hold on 
Bergström's account of alternatives. 
 
Fred Feldman's solution is somewhat similar to Bergström's. Feldman can be seen 
as restricting the application of (U) to a certain class of alternative-sets, in his case 
sets of life histories.  
 Feldman assumes that 'at every moment of moral choice, each agent has 
available to him a rather large supply of “life histories”, each of which is a set of 
acts exactly coinciding with all he has already done, and the rest of which he is still 
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able to perform' ([2], p 260) Furthermore, there is said to be a possible world for 
each possible life history, such that if the possible life history is lived out, this 
possible world is what will be the case. These possible worlds, ‘life history worlds’ 
as it was, can be ordered according to the amount of positive over negative value 
(utility) they contain. A life history world open for an agent at a specific time is 
said to be optimific if it's utility is no less than the utility of any other such world. 
The main thesis of Feldman's ‘World Utilitarianism’ can now be stated like this: 
 
 (WU) It is right at [a time] t for [a person] S to perform a at [the time associated   
with a =] t(a) if and only if there is a world, w, such that w is an optimific 
life history world for S at t, and S performs a at t(a) in w. ([2] p 266) 
 
In Case One this means that if a' is performed in the optimific life history world 
available to P at t (we suppose there is only one that is optimific), it is right for P at 
t to perform a'. Furthermore, since a' and b are incompatible, it is not right for P at 
t to perform b, since b cannot be performed in the same world as a'. 
 Feldman would probably regard a' as a conjunctive act consisting of a and c, 
where c is the act of reading the paper on smoking and lung-cancer. And he would 
hold that if the conjunctive act ac is done, then of course a is done and thus it 
would be right for P to do a, provided that a' is right. Feldman would thus avoid 
the problems in Case One while accepting a modified form of (c): ‘If a conjunctive 
act is right at a time (performed in an optimific world), then each of it's conjuncts is 
right at that time too (since they too are performed in this world) ”. 
 But we still do not know what the normative conclusions are in Case One. On 
Feldman's view, the example is insufficiently precise to determine the normative 
status of the actions. Nothing direct is said about the utility of the worlds in which 
the actions are performed. There are two problems: Firstly, Feldman does not say 
anything about when the consequences of an action are better than the 
consequences of a given different action. Secondly, if his theory is expanded in a 
reasonable way with a definition of this relation, the assumptions in Case One are 
incoherent. The expansion I have in mind is this: 
 
 (e) The consequences of an action a are better than the consequences of a 
time-identical and agent-identical action b iff a is performed in a world 
open to the agent of a at t(a) with a higher utility than any such world in 
which b is performed6. 
 
In addition I will say that one action is better than another iff the consequences of 
the one are better than the consequences of the other. 
 It now seems impossible to picture how, in Case One, b could be better than a, 
while ac (=a') is better than b. For Feldman, the fact that ac is done in a world 
implies that a is done in the same world, and since b is incompatible with a, it is 
not done in this world. Suppose that the best world open to P at t is w. If b is better 
than a, b is performed in this world. But then ac is not better than b since a is not 
                                                
6 This principle is faithful to the spirit of utilitarianism in making true the following: a) If 
one act is worse than an alternative act, it cannot be true that it is right, or ought to be 
done. b) If an agent must perfonn either of two actions, and one is better than the other, 
this action is right, and ought to be done. 
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performed in w, nor is ac, since it cannot be performed if a isn't. Case One 
becomes inconsistent. 
 
Jordan Howard Sobel could be seen as applying (U) to the set of lives securable at 
the moment in question. He suggests the following act-utilitarian principle: 
 
 (S) An action a ought to take place iff (i) a is contained in a life optimum 
among lives securable by the agent of a at this action's first moment (that 
is, a life optimum among those lives each of which would be secured by 
some fully specific minimal action open to the agent of a at the first 
moment of a) and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with a 
satisfies (i). (See [4], p 196) 
 
This principle calls for some explanation. That a life, L, would be secured by an 
action, a, means that if a is performed, L is lived out. That an action is minimal 
means that once begun, this action cannot be stopped. 
 Examples are placing a bet, beginning to swallow a chocolate, some ceases of 
swallowing a chocolate and beheading by guillotine. An action is fully specific if 
and only if there are no two minimal incompatible actions that are versions of it, in 
the sense defined on page 3. An action is contained in a life if it is true that if the 
life in question is lived, the action is performed. That a life is optimal means that, 
in Feldman's words, its life history world is optimific. 
 It is worthwhile to note that for Sobel, as for Bergström, actions are abstract 
entities, ‘propositions’ in Sobel's terminology. Thus, if it is true that a" is done, it 
follows logically that a is done. His theory also implies that if a' ought to take 
place, a ought to take place, whereas a" and b ought not to take place. In this 
respect Sobel's position is similar to Feldman's, and seems to cause the same 
problems: It is hard to apply (S) to Case One, as none of the actions in Case One 
seems to be fully specific minimal actions. But, as with Feldman's theory, (S) can 
be extended with a principle like (e), with the following results: If ac has better 
consequences than b, a too has better consequences than b. If on the other hand b 
has better consequences than a, it also has better consequences than ac. Thus it 
cannot be the case that, on Sobel's account, a' (ac) is better than b which is better 
than a. Again, Case One becomes inconsistent. 
 
Feldman's and Sobel's theories challenges Case One. Is there a reasonable 
interpretation of Case One on which the value-assumptions are consistent? In what 
sense, for example, is a better than b? I will now try to fill in the contours in Case 
One with a more detailed story which answers these questions. Here is such a 
story:  
 
If P has his cigarette and read that article, it will become evident to him 
that he is risking his health, and he will stop smoking the very same day. 
(Which would be very good for him.) P's ruining his health will not be 
evident to him if he smokes without reading that paper, or if he reads that 
paper without smoking. Thus a' is better than a" and b. 
 If P has his cigarette, this will make him somewhat drowsy, and he will 
neither enjoy his favourite TV show as he would do if he did not have this 
cigarette, nor read anything. This makes a somewhat worse than b.  
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 If P does a, he will in relevant aspects do the same thing as he would if 
he had done a''. This means that a", as well as a, is worse than b. 
 
This story does not seem to be utterly unrealistic. But it might be. It might for 
example be that the law-like conditional ‘If P does have his cigarette (If P does a), P 
will not read that paper’ is weird since P can perform a', that is, have his cigarette 
and read that paper. The conditional does not fit – it cannot be true if the 
assumptions about alternatives in Case One are to be true. To avoid this problem I 
will assume that (moral) freedom of decision is compatible with determinism. Even 
if my decision to do something or my doing it is causally determined, it might be a 
(morally) free decision or act. 
 
Torbjörn Tännsjö holds that act-utilitarianism should be concerned with concrete 
particular actions, that is, definite processes existing in space-time. It is these very 
processes that have consequences that can be normatively relevant. If we conceive 
of actions as concrete in this sense, cases like Case One ceases to be problematic for 
utilitarianism, Tännsjö holds. 
  I think Tännsjö would reason as follows about Case One: Suppose that if P does a 
(have a cigarette), this will be done during the time-interval t(a). Since b is an 
alternative to a, b would also be performed during t(a), since alternatives are time-
identical. And since a' and a'' are alternatives to b, they will be performed during 
t(a) too. Now, either a is the same concrete action as a' or a", or it is not. Since a's 
consequences are different from those of a' and a'', a is not identical with any of 
these. In that case, a' and a'' are alternatives to a, and vice versa. It might be 
somewhat surprising that P's having a cigarette right now is an alternative to P's 
having a cigarette and reading that paper right now. But on Tännsjö's view, the 
concrete action P would perform if P had a cigarette right now could very well be 
different from the concrete action P would perform if P had a cigarette and read 
that paper. It might for example be the case that P would not read that paper if P 
were to perform a, but P would do this if P performed a'. And if a and a' differ in 
such a way they cannot be the same concrete action. 
  If a is an alternative to a' and a'', there is only one alternative-set in Case One: 
{a, a', a", b}7, and in this set, the consequences of a' are better than those of the 
other alternatives. Neither (PI) nor (P2) arises. If a would have been identical with, 
say, a', it would logically speaking have the same consequences as a', and the 
alternative-set in (Cl) would have been {a, a", b} or equivalently {a', a", b}. (Since ‘a’ 
and ‘a'’ are two names for one and the same concrete action.) 
 
  
Case Two 
 
During a period T, P can either a (have a cigarette) or b (not have a 
cigarette). After this, P can during a period T' either c (read a paper on 
smoking and lung-cancer) or d (not read a paper on smoking and lung- 
cancer). It is also true that P can perform each of the following actions 
during T +T': ac (have a cigarette and read that paper), ad (have a 
cigarette but not read that paper), bc (not have a cigarette but read that 
paper) and bd (not have a cigarette and not read that paper). These 
                                                
7Only this set fulfils the requirements in (AS). 
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actions are unrealistically assumed to be the only actions P can perform 
during the rest of his life. 
 As a matter of fact, b and d is done. It is true that d is done regardless 
of what P does during T. That is, whether P performs a or b makes no 
difference when it comes to P's doing c or d. But it is not the case that P 
cannot perform c rather than d, he just doesn't. 
 These actions' consequences are valued as follows: b is better than a, c 
would have been better than d if a had been done, but d is better than c 
now that b has been done. Furthermore ac is better than bd which is 
better than bc which is better than ad. 
 The story behind the value-assumptions is this: Since d is performed, 
the only difference in value between a and b is that P's health is affected to 
the negative if he does a. The pleasure P sometimes gets from smoking is 
not had in this case – the only cigarette available was a Prince light. Thus 
b is better than a. Next, c is better than d if a has been done, as reading 
that article after having an unpleasant smoke will make P stop smoking 
earlier than he otherwise would, and the sooner he stops, the better. If, on 
the other hand, P did not have that cigarette, he would be practically 
unaffected by the paper, except for a small uneasiness felt when reading it. 
 Of the actions done during T +T', ac is the best. The unpleasant 
smoke together with the reading will make P stop smoking. This effect will 
not be had on any of the time-identical alternatives. Second best is bd as 
it does not cause any bad health or unpleasantness from smoking, nor any 
uneasiness from reading. Third is bc as the discomfort from reading is 
slightly less bad than the bad health gotten from smoking. The last 
alternative, ad, is accordingly the worst. 
 
Bergström would hold that ac ought to be done during T +T'. If a had been done, c 
would ought to be done, but since b is done, d ought to be done. Nothing will be 
said on the normative status of a and b, as neither of them is a member of a 
relevant alternative-set. The alternative-set {a, b} is not relevant as it is (U)-
inconsistent with the set containing the four actions performed during the whole of 
T +T'. (Bear in mind that there is no expansion of this set.) 
 Assuming that the actions mentioned in Case Two are the only ones P can 
perform during his life, Feldman would hold that the life history world where ac 
is performed is the best one available at t (= the beginning of T). It would then be 
right for P at t to perform this act, and consequentially it would be right for P at t 
to perform a and to perform c. As P does b, it will be right for him at t' (= the 
beginning of T') to perform d. If, however, P had performed a, it would have been 
right for him at t' to perform c, as c would be contained in the best life history 
world available to P at t'. 
 Sobel's theory would – under our unrealistic assumption – yield the following 
results: Actions a and b are the only fully specific minimal actions available to P at 
t. If P does a, he will have a bad cigarette, and will gain nothing from it. (P will 
perform d, remember.) As P does b, he will not have these unpleasant effects of 
smoking. It is then clear that b, but not a, is contained in the optimum among lives 
securable by P at t. Thus b ought to be done according to (S). It also follows that 
bd ought to be done, as it too is performed in this world. This is very different 
from the result of applying Bergström's and Feldman's theories to this case, and 
the reason is that Sobel wishes to take into account mistakes made by the agent at 
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a time later than the action in question. The reasoning is as follows: If P is to 
perform ac, which he ought to do according to theories like Bergström's, he will 
start off by doing a, but will then make the mistake to perform d. He will thus end 
up doing ad, which was the worst action performable during T+T'. In Sobel's 
words, ac is not securable as it cannot be begun in a way that is not interrupted 
by a mistake. The action bd can be begun in such a way and is better than any of 
it's alternatives. 
 A question naturally leaps to mind when one consider the following two 
features of Case Two: a) ac can be performed and b) ac cannot be begun such 
that it will be completed. Are these features really consistent? It seems to me that 
b) implies that ac cannot be performed. To perform an action, one needs to begin 
the performance of it. If this cannot be done in a way that leads to the action being 
performed, one cannot perform the action. And this means that the first two 
paragraphs in the description of Case Two is inconsistent. Questions like these will 
be discussed in part two and three of this essay. 
 Tännsjö would hold that if P performs b or ac or d, he has acted rightly. 
According to Tännsjö, P is here facing a moral dilemma: it is right for him to do b, 
but if he does, he will also perform bd, which would not be right for him to 
perform. Now, I have a hard time understanding this. It seems that the a P 
performs if he does ac is different from the a mentioned above, as it is followed by 
c. If we assume that c does not follow upon this a purely at random, c should be 
seen as a consequence of this a, and a good one too, which make the consequences 
of (this) a better than the consequences of b. Thus it seems that b isn't right after 
all. This will be discussed further in part two and three. 
 
I hope that what I have said this far gives the reader an idea of what the problem 
is about, and what the participants of the debate have said about the problem. In 
the parts that follow, I will be more critical and seek to settle the issue. 
 
 
Criteria of adequacy 
In this part of the essay I propose two criteria of adequacy for utilitarian theories. 
Each of them is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for an adequate theory, I 
claim. The criteria are: 
 
 (i) The theory should be concerned with performable, that is effectively 
decidable actions only. 
 (ii) The theory should count as consequences of actions only what is 
determined by these actions.  
 
I will use these criteria in a discussion of the coherence of Case Two, and in 
criticizing the theories of Feldman and Sobel. But first some explanation and to 
some extent a defense of the criteria: 
 
Effective decidability 
In ethics (at least as I conceive of it here), we are concerned with voluntary action, 
where ‘voluntary’ is to be understood in a broad sense, covering actions which are 
the result of subconscious as well as conscious decisions. For P to be able to 
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perform ac it must be possible for him to cause8 the performance of the action by 
a decision to perform it. In the given moment of choice, the conditional ‘if decision, 
then action’ must be a law-like9 truth. If P can form a decision to perform an act 
before performing the act and do this in such a way that the act is performed, I will 
say that he can effectively decide to perform the act in question, and I will 
furthermore take this to be a necessary and sufficient condition for this act being 
performable by P. 
 Someone might be tempted to argue that most actions are not the result of a 
given decision at a certain point of time. Rather, it is an on-going concern that 
keeps the action going. This point seems to be mostly terminological. In my 
vocabulary a decision is a kind of coming to have an intention. For the action 
decided upon to actually be performed, this intention or decision must be 
integrated enough, that is ‘supported by the person's whole motivational and 
cognitive orientation’10 to a certain degree. We can say that the intention must be 
kept up throughout the act, and that the act is thus kept going by an on-going 
concern.11 
 A different complication is this: It might be that the performance of an action is 
only made probable by the decision to perform it. How should we treat such cases? 
The probabilities we are concerned with here are metaphysical or ontological 
probabilities, not epistemological. It is not only that because of our limited 
cognitive or perceptual capabilities we cannot know, given knowledge of the 
decision and the situation in which it is made, that the action will be performed; 
there is no true law-like statements to the effect that if a decision exactly like this 
one is taken in this kind of situations, then an action exactly like this one will be 
performed. To put it differently: there are at least two possible worlds, exactly 
coinciding from the beginning of time up to and including the decision, such that in 
one of them the action is performed while in the other it is not.  
 The kind of situation I am to analyze then, is not one with which we are used to 
deal. But we are used to deal with (merely) epistemic probabilities in similar 
situations. Consider the following case: An athlete longs for a gold-medal. To get it, 
he will have to train very hard and forsake other things that he finds valuable. But 
he does not know for sure whether his best efforts will ever get him that gold-
medal, since he might get injured, or simply physically unable to run or jump as 
well as he would need to. It is natural for him to weigh the values of the possible 
                                                
8 The concept of  ‘cause’ I have in mind here, taken from J. L. Mackie’s “Causes and 
Conditions” (American Philosophical Quarterly 2 1965, pp. 245-64) can be spelled out like 
this: An event X takes place because of an event Y if  Y is an insufficient but necessary part 
of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for X. If X is P's doing a during T, and Y the 
decision in the situation of choice at t (=s) to perfom1 a, an unnecessary but sufficient 
condition for X might be P's decision in s to perfom1 a. P's decision to perform a is then an 
insufficient but necessary part of this condition. 
9 It might do with statistical laws (quantum mechanics). But that would be an extension of 
the common sense conception of choices and voluntary action. See the next section for more 
on this issue. 
10 Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry into the Freedom of Decision, Norwegian Universities Press 
1961, p 18. 
11 Sometimes we don't need a very well-integrated intention to start with, even if the action 
is of a very demanding type. We might during the acting get new motives and knowledge 
that supports our intention. But the initial intention with it's support was still, in the 
favoured terminology, a cause of the action being performed.  
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outcomes of trying to get that medal against their probabilities. And I propose that 
we should do the same when it comes to these ‘objective’ probabilities. When we 
consider the normative status of an action and come to know that it is only made 
probable by the decision, we should not only consider the consequences of our 
action, but also of possible different outcomes of trying to perform the action12, and 
weigh these  outcomes together by taking the value of each possible outcome of the 
decision in question, multiply with its probability given the decision, and add the 
products. The sum is the value of the decision's consequences or, in other words, 
the utility of the decision. If it is nonsensical to assign figures to probabilities and 
values of outcomes and treat them mathematically, the process could be made 
more intuitively, but along the same lines: intuitive probabilities are weighed 
against the intuitive values of outcomes, and it is all intuitively added together. As 
far as I can see, this is how we proceed when we take epistemic probabilities into 
account, and it seems reasonable to extend this procedure to objective 
probabilities.13 (The intuitive method would not give very precise or definite values, 
but in that case: should we really expect any?) This treatment leaves the action in 
question without any normative status, which seems intuitively reasonable; to say 
of an action which is only made probable by any decision to perform it that it is 
obligatory is to my ears very much like saying of an action that isn't performable 
that it is obligatory.  
 Before turning to the next criterion of adequacy, I will consider an argument 
that might tell against the first criterion of mine. Bergström argues (in [5], pp 97-
98) that an action can be obligatory without being performable in this sense. He 
asks us to consider the following dialogue: 
 
 X  ‘You ought to get up at six o' clock tomorrow morning.’ 
 Y ‘No, I ought not.’ 
 X ‘Why?’ 
 Y ‘Because I have decided to stay in bed tomorrow.’ 
 X ‘Surely, that is completely irrelevant. It doesn't in the least     contradict 
my     statement that you ought to get up at six. ' ’ 
 Y ‘Oh yes it does. Since I have decided to stay in bed tomorrow, I shall in fact 
not get up at six. And even if I were to forget my decision and start to get 
up, I would immediately remember it again and stop the action short of 
completion. I would merely pull the blanket over my head and try to get 
back to sleep.’ 
 X  ‘Do you mean to say that you cannot get up at six tomorrow, or that at 
least it  would be very difficult for you to do so?’ 
 Y ‘Not at all. Of course I can get up at six. I do that quite often. But I won't 
do it tomorrow. I don't want to, and that's why I have decided to stay in 
bed.’ 
 X ‘Would you agree that there are several different ways in which you could 
start to get up at six tomorrow?’ 
                                                
12 Trying to perform the action will in cases like this always be an effectively decidable 
action. 
13 One way to understand objective probabilities is to consider them limit cases of epistemic 
probabilities. Normally, we think it in principle possible to know which of some alternative 
states will be the case, for instance which side of a coin will turn up when it is tossed in a 
certain way. Objective probabilities are such that it is in principle impossible to know this. 
In both cases we should act on probabilities. 
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 Y ‘Yes, I suppose so.’ 
 X ‘Would you also agree that there is some way to start which would be 
followed by the reminder of the action?’ 
 Y ‘Certainly not. There is no way in which 1 could start to get up which is 
such that, if I were to start in this way, 1 would get up at six tomorrow.’ 
 X  ‘1 see. Well, then I must admit that it is not obligatory for you to get up at 
six. I was wrong when I said that you ought to do so.’ 
 
In Bergström's presentation, the dialogue is meant to show the absurdity in taking 
securability (in Sobel's sense of the word) to be necessary for obligatoriness. But I 
think that Bergström would like to use the same kind of argument against my 
performability-condition. Bergström claims that Y's argument is absurd, and that 
there is nothing that should motivate X's change of mind. 
 In the dialogue, Y claims that there is no way to start getting up which will be 
followed by Y getting up. If this is true, the act of getting up would according to my 
performability-condition be impossible for Y to perform. This would be a reductio of 
my position since I would have to accept the absurd argument of Y's. Luckily, Y's 
argument is not absurd in accepting a link between performability and 
securability, or between performability and effective decidability. The absurdity of 
the dialogue comes from the weird psychology of it's characters or from some very 
unusual context which is not spelled out. For one, Y's claim that he won't get up at 
six, no matter what precautions are taken, is surely absurd. He could, for example, 
presumably act upon the moral advantages of getting up early, or sign a legally 
binding promise to give away all his money, should he not get up. (Remembering 
the promise will make him jump right out of his bed quick as ... ) Moreover, Y only 
considers starting getting up out of habit or due to having temporarily forgotten his 
decision not to get up, but not that he should start getting up as a result of a 
decision to get up. This is an odd oversight. So it seems to me that if Y's claim is to 
be true, he or the setting of the dialogue must be very strange. 
 A different but equally striking absurdity is that Y is allowed to argue from his 
not wanting to get up to his not being (in my sense) able to get up. In performing a 
voluntary action, we do what we want to do. If we had acted differently, this would 
have been because of our wanting to act differently, and it seems that Y in a 
morally relevant sense could have wanted to get up; had he been slightly less lazy, 
or just a bit more concerned about other peoples well-being, he would have wanted 
it. Again, either the situation in which X is talking to Y or X himself must be highly 
unusual. Since this is the case, it is very hard to assess the bearing of our 
intuitions in this case. If one starts from absurd premises one is likely to reach 
absurd conclusions no matter how respectable rules of inference or reasoning one is 
using. I conclude that a fair counter- example to my performability-condition is still 
wanting. 
 
 
Consequences are determined by action 
I believe that an adequate utilitarian theory should count as consequences of an 
action only those events or states of affaires that are determined by the 
performance of the action, either logically or causally.14 (If I eat a lot of food, it 
follows logically that a lot of food is eaten, and it follows causally that I have had 
                                                
14The concept of cause I have in mind here was introduced in footnote 8. 
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enough to eat.) This is my second requirement which means that things that 
happen by pure chance (things that are unpredictable in principle) will not be 
counted as consequences. In [6], Tännsjö does not accept this; at least he argues 
against Bergström's theory in a way that presupposes that the requirement does 
not hold.15 But since he provides no argument against it and as I believe that it is 
both normatively and descriptively reasonable, I will let it stand. 
                                                
15The paragraphs I have in mind is part of an argument for concretism and against 
Bergström's theory in which alternatives are abstract entities. The argument goes that if 
we do not accept a concretist account of alternatives, either we will have to make a 
maximally specific description of the action, which is the same as to specify exactly which 
concrete action we have in mind, or we will - unacceptably - have to presuppose that (a 
simple) determinism is true. Tännsjö holds that if we don't make fully specific descriptions 
of the alternatives or conceive of them as concrete, there will always be versions (in the 
sense defined on p 3) of any given alternative. And if deteminism is false it might as long as 
there are versions of a given action be some versions of the action that are worse, and some 
that are better than any alternative to it...  
 
For even if there are no empirical laws to the effect that one version brings about a 
certain effect if may happen in a concrete unique case that the action is followed by 
this 'effect' (which would not have resulted if some alternative action had been 
performed instead). ([6], p 6). 
 
This would mean that no action with versions, that is, no actions but the fully specific or 
concrete ones, could be members of what Bergström calls relevant alternative-sets, and 
consequently no such action would have normative status. If this is true, only fully specific 
or concrete actions would have normative status, and this is what Tännsjö argues. Tännsjö 
seems to hold that even if determinism is false, it might be true that one version of an 
action is followed by an event which would not have followed if a different version of that 
action had been performed. I find this somewhat puzzling. So, without making any 
ontological assumptions, I will use the language of possible worlds to try to clarify things. 
Tännsjö speaks as if the following could be true:  
 
 (i) In the possible world where the version a' of the alternative a is performed, the 
event e   takes place. 
 (ii) In the possible world where a", a version of a incompatible with a', is performed, e 
does not take place. 
 
However, since only one of a' and a" can be performed, at least one of these propositions 
must be a counterfactual truth, which makes it a law-like truth that if a' (a") is performed, 
then e will (will not) take place. Suppose that a' is performed in the actual world, then (ii) is 
a counterfactual truth. But so is (i)! This is because (i) talks about the possible world in 
which a' is performed. If there is only one such world, it is eo ipso a law-like truth that e 
follows upon a'. Tännsjö would probably not assert both (i) and (ii) then. The passage ‘...it 
may happen in a concrete unique case that the action is followed by this "effect"’ from the 
quotation above could in this example be taken to mean that e takes place after a' is done, 
while  
 
 (iii) There are some possible world(s) in which a' is performed and e does not take 
place, as well as some where a' is performed and e does take place.  
 
In that case it just happened that in the actual world, where a' is done, e takes place. 
Consequentially, e was not determined by the performance of a'. But then it is unreasonable 
to take the occurrence of e as a consequence of a'. The performance of a' makes it to some 
degree, say p, probable that e should take place, but it does not make it true that e takes 
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 If an action does not determine any outcome, but make several outcomes 
probable to some degrees, the value of the actions consequences is the sum of the 
values of the different possible outcomes weighed against the probabilities of the 
outcomes. 
 
 
Criticism 
In this part the two criteria from part two will be applied first to Case Two, which 
turns out to be inconsistent if my concept of performability is assumed, then to the 
theories proposed by the participants of the debate, of which Feldman's and Sobel's 
are refuted. The theories of Tännsjö and Bergström are also discussed and put in 
doubt. 
 
Case Two revisited 
In Case Two, the following is true: 
 
 (i) At t, P can perform a and b, and only these, during T. 
 (ii) Regardless of what is done during T, P can at t' perform c and d, and only 
these, during T'. 
 
 Does it follow from (i) and (ii) that 
 
 (iii) at t, P can perform ac during T +T'? 
 
The validity of such a deduction seems to be implicit or explicit in parts of the 
discussion of alternative-sets.16 But it will be clear that (iii) does not follow from (i) 
and (ii), neither in general, nor in cases like Case Two. In fact, these three 
properties together make Case Two inconsistent. 
 One trivial way in which the deduction from (i) and (ii) to (iii) does not hold in 
general is the following: it might at t be impossible for P to know that c will be an 
option. If so, P can at t neither decide to perform c, nor decide to perform ac , 
since this involves deciding to perform c. (Remember that performable acts are 
effectively decidable.) We could along these lines explain why, in Case Two,  
 
 (iv) d is done during T', regardless of what is done during T. 
 
On this explanation, P is not very interested in medical research, and when, at t', 
he stumbles upon the up to then unknown article on smoking and lung-cancer, he 
instinctively puts it aside. But since the explanation implies that ac is not 
performable, it would make Case Two inconsistent. 
 To save Case Two from inconsistency and to show that the deduction holds in 
it, we need a different but reasonable explanation of (iv) which does not make false 
one of (i) through (iii). Even though these four features of Case Two are shared by 
                                                                                                                                          
place. That is the work of chance. (Of course, if a" rather than a' had been performed, e 
would not have taken place, which makes it true that the performance of a' rather than a" 
made the probability of e's occurring p rather than zero.) 
16For example, Sobel's definition of  ‘open ('performable') action’ (p198 in [4]) makes this 
deduction valid. The definition is used throughout [4]. 
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several thought-experiments in the debate, no such explanation will be found; 
consequently many arguments put forward by the participants of the debate rest 
on shaky ground.17 (In fact, most of what has been said in [2], [4], [5] and [6] is 
infected by these incoherent examples.) Here is why Case Two and corresponding 
examples are incoherent: 
 If P performs the voluntary action ac, he will at t decide to perform it and, 
because of this decision, perform it during T+T'. Suppose that P at t can and does 
decide to perform ac. He performs a. but, – alas! – according to (iv) he diverges 
from his decided path at t'. Why is that? There can be two kinds of explanations for 
this: Either the divergence is some sort of indeterministic freak (micro-physical or 
a God's act of fancy). Or it was predetermined all along. 
 If the divergence was predetermined, it seems that ac could not be performed 
after all: At t, there were (according to (i)) exactly two ways open for P. One of 
these, b, was sure to lead away from the performance of ac. The other way was 
not such that P's decision at t to perform ac caused ac to be performed. It will 
not help to say that ‘maybe P didn't try hard enough’, or ‘his decision was not well-
integrated’, since the only alternative to this ineffective decision was to go for b. 
 If, on the other hand, the divergence was not predetermined, the causal link 
between the decision and the performance is broken. Again, there was no way to 
cause the performance of ac by the decision to perform ac. 
 To sum up: if (i), (ii) and (iv) are true, P cannot effectively decide to perform 
ac, and therefore cannot perform the act.18 The incoherence of Case Two can show 
itself in other ways. In the application of Tännsjö's theory to Case Two (see p 10), 
the performability of ac was taken for granted, and feature (i) above was 
implicitly put in question. Even if a (having a smoke) was followed by d, which 
made a a poor alternative, there had to be (since ac was taken to be performable) 
a different a or a different way of having a smoke which would lead to c being 
performed, namely the smoking initiated by the effective decision to perform ac. 
 This means that (i) does not hold if (ii), (iii) and (iv) are true. It also means that 
moral dilemmas of the kind Tännsjö has been discussing in his papers are illusory, 
based on incoherent thought-experiments. (This does not, of course, detract from 
the plausibility of Tännsjö's theory.) 
 
Feldman's theory 
Feldman's World-Utilitarianism was formulated like this in his [2]:  
 
 (WU) It is right at [a time] t for [a person] S to perform a at [the time associated 
with a =] t(a) if and only if there is a world, w, such that w is an optimific 
life history world for S at t, and S performs a at t(a) in w. ([2] p 266) 
 
In addition, Feldman holds that an act is obligatory for an agent at a time if and 
only if the act is performed in every optimific life history world open to the agent at 
the time. Notice that this does not preclude that the obligatory act is performed in 
life history worlds (open to the person at the time) which are worse than all other 
                                                
17Bergström's Example 3 in [2] is in relevant ways like Case Two, and so is Sobel's Case I 
([4], pp 199-200) which also shapes the discussion in Bergström's [5] which in turn plays an 
important role in Tännsjö's [6] and [7]. 
18Again, a slightly different treatment is needed if P's sticking to the path of ac was made 
metaphysically or ontologically probable by his decision. 
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life history worlds (open to the person at the time). Nor does it preclude that an 
action is obligatory even when it is performed in all the disastrous life history 
worlds (open to...) just because it is performed in the optimific world, which might 
be just barely better than a host of other worlds. This means that an action that is 
obligatory can be a virtual disaster if, as is typically the case, it is performed in 
‘wrong’ world. How can this be implications of a satisfactory theory? 
 I can think of several answers that Feldman could invoke to his defense, but in 
the end, none is satisfactory. But let's have a look at an example. Imagine the 
following: a man is flying with his child in a one-seated aeroplane when he runs 
out of fuel. He can try to reach a good landing spot by using the altitude and 
velocity of the plane (ending the flight in a crash resulting in ugly but not 
permanent wounds) or he can jump (there is a perfectly good parachute in the 
plane) carrying his child in his arms. He jumps, but since he doesn't release the 
parachute, he gets paralysed from neck and down. The child dies. If he had used 
the parachute, it would have landed him and the child safely. Assuming that the 
optimific life history worlds open to the man before the jump all included the 
parachute descent, to jump was at the time right as well as obligatory for him 
according to (WU). Feldman's first line of defense could then be to claim that the 
man's performing the action ‘to jump’ did not determine the fatal landing, and 
accordingly that the paralysis and the child's death isn't a consequence of the 
action.19 The reason should be that the action 'to jump' is too unspecific; it has 
several versions, some of which contains the parachute descent. Since the natural 
thing to do if one jumped would be to release the parachute, it might be that for the 
man to jump determines that the release is very probably performed. If this is the 
case, it might be right to say that it was right to jump, but that the man screwed 
up. But suppose instead that if the man jumps, it is very unlikely that he will get 
to releasing the parachute, or in other words: there are many worlds open to him in 
which he jumps, but very few in which he does a parachute descent. One would 
now like to say not that he ought to jump, but that he ought to parachute jump or – 
since it is very uncertain whether he will use the parachute even if he starts 
jumping with the intention to use it – that he ought to go for an emergency 
landing.20 But Feldman's theory would still hold that it is right to jump and even 
that it is obligatory. 
 Maybe I have misinterpreted Feldman in giving this kind of an example. There 
are some indications in [2] to the effect that Feldman's theory is about concrete 
acts; on page 256 he writes that act-utilitarianism is best construed as a theory 
about concrete acts, understood as ‘particular, dated, non-repeatable individuals 
such as the walk I took yesterday afternoon, the robbery committed last night at 
Amherst, and my wife's writing a check at noon today’. If Feldman had given some 
examples of acts that have not been performed, the case would be easier to settle. 
Even if one talks about particular abstract acts, one can be taken to talk about 
concrete acts (in Tännsjö's sense) if one mentions only acts that as a matter of fact 
have been or are performed. Whether Feldman would hold that actions that are not 
performed are concrete in this sense is still open, but we could ask what difference 
it would make if Feldman followed Tännsjö on this point. 
 If Feldman's is a concretist theory, ‘the man ought to jump’ assigns a certain 
normative status to a concrete action that exists during a certain time-interval and 
                                                
19Assuming that the theory fulfils the second criteria of adequacy. 
20I think it wrong to say that he ought to parachute jump if the outcome of his trying to 
parachute jump is this uncertain. See part two, section one (effective decidability) above. 
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within a certain space. Assume first that the concrete action referred to exists from 
a point of time when the man leaps out of the plane until he reaches the ground, 
and that the man does not use the parachute. This is the concrete act of jumping 
which the man in the case performs, and an act like that is presumably not 
contained in any optimific life history world open to the man before he jumps, so 
Feldman does not have to say that what he did was right at the time of the jump. 
This concretist interpretation of the example seems to have avoided the problem. 
 But let us instead assume that we refer to a concrete action which exists 
during a time interval ranging from the moment the man decides that he should 
jump until his next moment of ‘moral choice’, presumably shortly after he leaves 
the plane. During all of this concrete action, the man intends to release the 
parachute shortly after jumping out of the plane. But, falling through the air he 
suddenly comes to think it a great or even beautiful thing to be crushed to the 
ground with the child in his arms (he is mesmerized by a sense of weightlessness, I 
guess). He can pull the release, but he doesn't want to and because of this the child 
is crushed dead and the man's spine is broken. Still, according to Feldman, the 
man's jumping could even have been obligatory, since the (concrete) jump could be 
included in all the best life history worlds open to him at the time, life history 
worlds where the jump is followed by the parachute release. I find this 
unreasonable, but let's have a closer look. Assume that the death of the man's child 
and his own disablement was caused by the decision to jump, and furthermore that 
every alternative concrete act of which it is true that the man jumps with his child 
in his arms also has as a consequence that they are both crushed. I cannot see how 
such an act can be right or obligatory. Of course, we have to take into account if the 
decision to jump caused neither the disaster nor the decision not to use the 
parachute, but made them probable to some degree. Again, even if the chances for 
the jump to end in a happy landing are but a tiny fraction of the chances for a 
disaster, Feldman would tell us that it is right to jump, as the improbable world 
were the man does use the parachute is one of the best life history worlds open to 
the man. It could at the same time be wrong to do an emergency landing as long as 
this action isn't contained in the very best world open to the man at the time, even 
if this action is contained in most of the better worlds, but in none of the worlds 
where the disaster takes place. To me this seems to be very much against the spirit 
and the appeal of consequentialism. Feldman could argue that there was nothing 
wrong with the act of jumping – it was the failure to pull the release that was 
wrong. But then it would be far-fetched to call it an act-consequentialist theory21, 
and act-consequentialist theories are my interest in this essay. I will therefore look 
for a better theory.22 
 
Sobel's theory 
 
 (S) An action a ought to take place iff (i) a is contained in a life optimum 
among lives securable by the agent of a at this action's first moment (that 
is, a life optimum among those lives each of which would be secured by 
some fully specific minimal action open to the agent of a at the first 
                                                
21Admittedly, Feldman does not call his theory a consequentialist one: utilitarianism is 
what he is concerned with. 
22In some ideal sense, that is provided that the man did everything else as he ought to, one 
might say that he acted rightly. Compare Bergström's discussion of ideal notions of ‘ought’ 
in [3], especially on page 128. 
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moment of a) and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with a 
satisfies (i). (See [4], p 196) 
 
I am going to see what (S) does to the example in the last section. But first it is 
important to understand what it is for an action to be contained in a life. Notice 
that actions, as Sobel conceive of them, are propositions expressed by sentences 
such as ‘The man jumps’ ([4], p 197). An action is now said to be contained in a life 
L just in case it is true at L's first moment that the action would take place if L 
were lived; 
 
So actions logically entailed by sets of actions in L are contained in L, and 
so are actions that, roughly and intuitively, consist of such entailed actions 
together with parts of what would be their conventional and causal 
upshots. ([4], p 199) 
 
The picture of a life as a conjunction of propositions with logical implications 
emerges. If we go by this picture we can generate the following violation of what I 
believe is the spirit of act-consequentialism: Assume that ‘The man jumps out of 
the aeroplane with his child on his arm, releases the parachute and lands safely on 
the ground’ is an action (call it a) contained in the life optimum among lives 
securable by the man at the first moment of this action. According to Sobel, it 
ought to take place. But it is entailed by the performance (=making true) of this 
action23 that ‘The man jumps out of the aeroplane’ (call it a*) is performed (made 
true), wherefore this action ought to be done, too. And here the problem from the 
last section appears again: Sobel will hold that a* ought to be done even if it is 
contained in some or many lives that are far from optimum: namely the lives of 
which it is true that the man jumps but chooses not to pull the release. It does not 
matter whether a* is contained in every disastrous life or is most probably 
performed in a way that ends in disaster, as long as it is contained in this single 
optimum life. 
 However, Sobel does avoid one of Feldman's problems as he can treat actions 
performed after the actions we are considering as consequences of actions that are 
performed now; instead of counting what could be done if an action is performed, 
he considers what would be done if the action is performed. This is clearly more in 
line with my demand that consequences are determined (causally or logically) by 
the action. 
 
How could Sobel avoid the problem he gets in cases like the one with the jump? 
The source of the problem is that an action can be contained in several lives, and 
that only the membership of the best of these lives counts in giving the action a 
normative status. The most straightforward way to avoid the problem would be to 
restrict oneself to actions that are contained in only one life, what would be called a 
fully specific action. Another, similar way to avoid the problem is to hold that less 
specific actions aren't logically implied by more specific actions. The reason could 
be that the action is individuated not only by what is said to be true about it, but 
also by what isn't said e.g: that ‘The man jumps’ is performed does not follow from 
the fact that ‘The man jumps without using the parachute’ is performed, since if 
the man performs the first of these actions, he neither uses the parachute, nor 
                                                
23If it is taken as a proposition or set of propositions. 
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abstains from using the parachute. In other words, the principle of bivalence does 
not hold for abstract actions on this construction. From this it follows that ‘The 
man jumps’ can be an alternative to ‘The man jumps without a parachute’ (and this 
seems somewhat contra-intuitive). A different solution would be to somehow weigh 
together the utilities of the different lives in which the action is contained, 
presumably by weighing the utility of each life against the probability of that life, 
given the action. The first two solutions would be somewhat like Tännsjö's: only 
actions that have no versions are taken into account. The third solution would be a 
(fairly) new one, I believe. 
 
Tännsjö's theory 
Tännsjö does not accept my two criteria, since he would accept the formulation of 
cases like Case Two. One consequence of this was that a person finding himself in a 
situation like the one in Case Two faces a moral dilemma: he ought to do ac, but 
if he does, he will also perform a, which ought not to be done. If Tännsjö would 
come to accept my criteria of adequacy, his theory would avoid this problem, as it 
does avoid the problems in Case One. Other problems remain, however. In the 
discussion of Case One I noted that P's having a cigarette would be an alternative 
to P's having a cigarette and reading the paper on smoking and lung-cancer, since 
they might be different concrete actions which cannot be performed together. This 
seemed to be rather contra-intuitive. Consider: 
 
First dialogue  
‘I think he should go to the movies.’ 
‘No, he should go to the movies and see “Batman”.’ 
 
Second dialogue  
‘What's bothering you?’ 
‘I do not know what I should do. Either I will go to the movies or I will go to 
the movies and see “Batman”.’  
 
Third dialogue 
‘Do you think it a good idea to go to the movies?’ 
‘Yes, if you see “Batman”.’ 
 
To my mind, and to people I have asked for an opinion, it is clear that the first and 
the second dialogue are absurd, while the third is quite plausible. But what is the 
proper diagnosis of the absurdity of the first dialogues? 
 As I said above, a concrete action like the one the person would perform if he 
went to the movies can very well be different from the concrete action he would 
perform if he went to the movies to see ‘Batman’. So why is the negative answer in 
the first dialogue absurd? The least far-fetched answer is that it is very 
unreasonable to expect the two actions to be incompatible. But this is not the case 
if the actions we usually have in mind when considering questions like these are 
concrete. In the second dialogue: why is it strange that someone is trying to make 
up his mind whether he should go to the movies or go to the movies and see 
‘Batman’. Presumably since these actions aren't incompatible. And why is the 
affirmative answer in the third dialogue quite plausible? Again: the actions are not 
incompatible. 
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 One of Tännsjö's reasons for accepting concretism is that it is the more ‘natural’ 
view of actions ([6], p 3). I think the dialogues and what has been said about them 
makes this claim rather implausible. But Tännsjö's main argument for concretism 
is that the non-concretist will have a hard time telling us how abstract actions can 
have consequences. If this proves too difficult, we might have to become concretists 
in order to avoid the problems, even if concretism isn't the most natural way to 
conceive of alternatives.24 My first step in assessing the validity of this argument 
will be to understand how the concretist accounts for the consequences of 
alternative actions. Tännsjö's idea in [6] seems to be that everything that happens 
in the world where an action is performed is a consequence of the action (see 
footnote 17). In part two, section two, we saw that this won't do. Instead I propose 
the following: 
 Assume that L is the conjunction of all law-like truths (statistical and/or 
deterministic). Assume further that the world-description D(c) is the conjunction of 
everything that would be true of the concrete action c and the world as it is when c 
is begun.25 Everything that follows logically from L and D(c) is what follows from 
the performance of c. Call the conjunction of this R(c). The results of the 
alternatives c', c',... cn to c26 are R(c'), R(c"),... R(cn). The consequences of c can now 
be defined as everything which follows from R(c) but doesn't follow from everyone 
of R(c'), R(c"),... R(cn).27 Now, the same account seems to work for abstract actions. 
Admittedly, if an abstract action, a, is less specific than the conjunction of all true 
statements about c, D(a) is less specific than D(c), and consequently R(a) might be 
less specific than R(c). But I see no a priori reason for assuming that consequences 
of alternatives always should be as specific as the consequences of concrete actions. 
 Tännsjö would object that hardly any positive state of affaires is necessitated 
by the performance of an action like ‘P's studying philosophy at university U 
during 1993’, even if the action is taken to be performed in a certain environment. 
Probably only statements like ‘P will not study psychology at university C’ will 
follow. And this seems to be a reductio of the non-concretist position since we 
usually think that an action like my studying philosophy at Uppsala next year 
would have more, and more specific, consequences than this. There is a remedy, 
however. I believe there is an implicit agreement that we consider how the person 
                                                
241 am quite sympathetic to concretist accounts of actual and performed actions. But it is a 
different matter to understand what we are comparing when we think of not as yet 
performed possible actions or actions that neither have nor will be performed. The later 
problem seems more interesting when it comes to ethics or problems in the theory of 
decision. 
25‘the world as it is when the action is begun’ signifies a state of affaires exactly similar to 
the state of affaires in which the actualized of the alternatives is begun in, except from 
what follows logically and causally from the fact that this different action is begun in it. 
26‘the alternatives to c’ should here be understood as every action with which c should be 
compared for it's normative status. 
27Sometimes philosophers claim that the consequences of an action are those events that 
would occur if the action is performed, but would not occur if the action isn't performed. 
This assumes that there is one answer to what would happen if the action isn't performed, 
but since we most often face more than two alternatives, several different things can 
happen. The definition above solves that problem. A simpler way to solve the problem 
would be to identify the result of an action (as defined above) with it's consequences. But 
this would make something that happens in a gambling hall in Hong Kong immediately 
after my switching of my computer a consequence of my switching, even though I could 
have made nothing to prevent it. 
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in question would perform the abstract action, given his capacity, personality and 
the situation in which the action is performed. We say things like: ‘If I would have 
stayed at my place Friday night, l probably would have watched TV. That's the way 
it usually happens’ or ‘If he goes to the movies, he will see “Casablanca”. The guy 
just loves Bogart and Bergman’. If the action we are thinking and talking about 
isn't actually performed, or if it isn't yet performed, we have to consider the person 
with a personality somewhat different from the personality he actually had (or has) 
when the action he actually performed was started. To the very least he would 
have wanted to do something else, and for some reasons which would not be 
identical with those that actually made him act. These are complicated issues, but 
bere it suffices to note that there are ways (actually in use, I take it) to expand D(a) 
such that there will be something positive, even a lot, to say about the 
consequences of a particular abstract action. The reductio suggested above is 
avoided. In fact, when Tännsjö discusses how we are to refer to possible concrete 
actions, he suggests that we refer to them by using expressions like ‘what he would 
do if he were to decide to (perform the abstract action to) go to the movies’. 
(Compare [6], p 9) If this would suffice to point out a specific concrete action, it will 
also allow us to get a sufficiently – perhaps fully – specific world-description D(‘He 
goes to the movies’), and in turn sufficiently specific consequences C(‘He goes to the 
movies’). If, on the other hand, it does not suffice to point out concrete actions, a 
reasonable account of how one can refer to a concrete action is lacking. 
 
Bergström's theory 
Consider the following alternatives: either I go to the movies (a), or I don't (¬a). 
The consequences of a are better than those of ¬a. What reasons could we have for 
being discontented with this alternative-set when we are inquiring into what I 
ought to do? I suggest that the following two reasons are important when it comes 
to expanding alternative-sets: 
    i) We believe that there are ways to go to the movies that have better 
consequences than simply going to the movies. If I went to the movies I might for 
example come to see ‘Batman’. But it happens that ‘The third man’ would give me 
more pleasure and intellectual stimulation; ‘I go to the movies and see “The third 
man”’ (a') has better consequences than a. In the following dialogue, an expansion 
of {a, ¬a} is made: 
 
Fourth Dialogue 
‘Do you think I should go to the movies?’ 
‘Yes, if you see “The third man”.’  
 
The new alternative-set is {a', a'' ¬a}, where a' is the act of going to the movies and 
see ‘The third man’ and a" is the act of going to the movies without seeing ‘The 
third man’; 
    ii) We believe there are versions of not going to the movies that are better than 
going to the movies. If I decided not to go to the movies, I would end up on the sofa 
eating cheese doodles and watching ‘Miami Vice’. But I could for example do some 
useful studying (¬a'), which would have better consequences than just not going to 
the movies. 
 
Fifth Dialogue 
‘I think I should go to the movies rather than not.’ 
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‘No, you should not. It would be better if you did some studying tonight. 
[And, for reasons under ii):] 
‘I still think I should go to the movies. They give “The third man” at the 
Odeon tonight, and I know it's damn good.’ 
 
This story could go on for a very long time. The person I am talking to might claim 
that if I stay at my place and study Nietzsches ‘The will to power’, this will be even 
better than watching Orson Wells in that great film of his, and I could retort that I 
could read some Nietzsche on my way to the movies... 
 Considerations like those under ii) led Bergström to applying the utilitarian 
principle only to relevant alternative-sets (as defined by (R)). In [1] (p 52) he 
proposed another necessary condition for relevant alternative-sets roughly 
corresponding to the first reason for expanding alternative-sets. It has however 
been shown by Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz28 that Bergström's theory implies that in 
some cases two alternative actions are obligatory. Since the proof is somewhat 
complicated I will not give any details of it, but the main idea is that by starting 
from different alternative-sets we can prove the obligatoriness of two incompatible 
actions. As far as I can see, the proof is a reductio ad absurdum of Bergström's 
theory. 
 There is also a different problem with Bergström's theory. It might for example 
have better consequences to perform the abstract act of going to the movies than to 
perform the abstract act of going to the movies and see “Batman”. Sometimes it 
might be hard to change one's mind once a decision is made even though new 
information should make a version not decided upon more attractive and it is 
generally a good thing to leave room for spontaneous reactions to the environment. 
But none of Bergström's proposed criteria for relevant alternative-sets could give 
one a reason to ‘step back’ from one alternative-set to a set with less specific 
actions. Because of this, and because of the problem discovered by Rabinowicz, we 
have to find a better theory. 
 
 
Suggestions 
Remember the question in the beginning of the essay: what are the alternatives in 
a situation of deliberation and planning? This question could be interpreted in the 
following two ways: 
 
 (1’) What actions should be compared with regard to their consequences when 
the act-utilitarian criterion of rightness is applied? 
 (1") What alternative-set is it rational to chose from in a situation of 
deliberation and planning?  
 
I am well aware of there being several other, perhaps interesting, interpretations 
of the question, but I will concentrate on these. 
 To answer the first question, we need an act-utilitarian criterion of rightness. I 
propose the following: 
 
                                                
28‘Utilitarianism and conflicting obligations’ (Theoria 1978) 
 Alternatives  22 
 
 (UR) An action, a, is right if and only if (i) no alternative to a has better 
consequences than a, (ii) no version of a has better consequences than a. 
and (iii) a is not a version of an action with better consequences than a.  
 
An action b is an alternative to an action a if and only if a and b are are (i) 
performable in the same situation, (ii) agent-identical and (iii) incompatible. 
‘Version’ means the same as ‘version or quasi-version’ in Bergström's sense. Notice 
that the two first conditions in (UR) correspond to the two reasons for expanding 
alternative-sets that were discussed in the section on Bergström's theory. The third 
condition implies that it might be right not to choose a more specific action; 
sometimes it is better to decide how to perform the action after having chosen to 
perform it or after having begun the performance of it. Not leaving any room to 
account for this was one of the drawbacks of Bergström's theory. 
 I believe that (UR) answers question (1'): an action should be compared with all 
it's alternatives, all it's versions and all actions of which it is a version. The 
criterion of rightness could be supplied with the following: 
 
 (UO) An action, a, ought to be performed/is obligatory if and only if (i) a is right 
and (ii) there is no alternative to a which is right.  
 (UW) An action, a, is wrong if and only if (i) a is not right, (ii) there is no version 
of a that is right.  
 
The second clause in (UW) is meant to do justice to our intuitions vis-à-vis the 
fourth dialogue in the section on Bergström's theory. Let us assume that my going 
to the movies has worse consequences than my staying home, but that my going to 
the movies to see ‘The third man’ has better consequences than both these actions. 
Let us furthermore assume that there are no other possible alternatives to, or 
versions of, these actions. It is now reasonable to hold that I ought to go to the 
movies to see ‘The third man’. But it is not reasonable to hold that it is wrong to go 
to the movies, since I ought to go to the movies and see ‘The third man’. Neither is 
it reasonable to hold that it is right to go to the movies, because of this action's 
consequences: if I go to the movies (period), I will in fact see ‘Batman’, and this will 
have worse consequences than going to the movies to see ‘The third man’. That is 
why the person in the dialogue answers ‘Yes’, but adds ‘if you see “The third man”’ 
which in effect is to say that I ought to go to the movies to see ‘The third man’. He 
doesn't answer my question since the action I ask him about is too unspecific to 
have any normative status. 
 Suppose that we find ourselves in a situation of deliberation or planning, and 
that we want to act like good act-utilitarians (if there is such a way to act). We are 
confronted with some alternatives. Is it rational to chose the best one of these 
alternatives, or should we look at some other set, for example an expansion of this 
set? With the reservation that the meaning of ‘rational’ I will use here might be 
different from the one Bergström uses, I suggest that we should take into account 
versions of our original alternatives, or actions of which our original actions are 
version if we think such an action has better consequences than any of our original 
actions. This might be a good answer to (1''). 
 Another way to see the problem is this: our taking into consideration new 
actions is itself an action. We then ought to do this if and only if this action 
satisfies the criteria in (UO). It is right to do it if and only if our changing the 
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alternative set is right according to (UR). It is wrong to do it if it is wrong according 
to (UW). 
 
The first of the two questions which started this essay has been answered. The 
second question was how a coherent formulation of act-utilitarianism should look 
like. I believe that my three criteria of rightness, obligatoriness and wrongness 
respectively form the basis of such a formulation, given other ideas that I have put 
forth, especially ideas concerning performability and consequences. 
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